Who Gets to Be a Woman?: Feminist Politics and the Question of Trans-inclusion by Elliot, Patricia
13
Atlantis, Volume 29.1, Fall/Winter 2004
Who Gets to Be a Woman?: 
Feminist Politics and the Question of Trans-inclusion1
Patricia Elliot
ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the recent and ongoing battle involving Kimberley Nixon and her non-trans feminist supporters and detractors.
Although non-trans feminists profess a desire to accept diversity, and to create a world that eschews oppression, we often fail to embrace
those ideals, which deepens divisions among us and further alienates the trans community. Our capacity to become better allies depends
on further reflection on this particular conflict and the theories that support it.  
RÉSUMÉ
Cet article discute de la lutte récente de Kimberley Nixon et de ses partisanes non-trans féministes et détractrices. Quoique les non-trans
féministes professent un désir d'accepter la diversité, et créent un monde qui évite l'oppression, nous manquons souvent de vivre ces idéaux,
ce qui agrandit les divisions entre nous et aliène encore plus la communauté trans. Notre capacité de devenir de meilleures alliées dépend
sur plus de prise se réflexion sur ce conflit particulier et les théories qui l'appuient.
Whenever a crisis emerges in the realm of
feminist practice, feminists are confronted with our internal
divisions and forced, not against our will but because of our
desire to know, into discussions with each other that are
both painful and transformative. The relationship of
non-trans feminists to transgender persons (many of whom
are also feminists) constitutes a relatively new crisis in the
way differences with "others" are addressed, differences
within what gets considered the collective identity of
feminism, and differences to our understanding of sexual
politics.  Previously, feminist encounters with differences2
of race, class, ability, and sexual orientation culminated in
some positive results. These include: ensuring that formerly
excluded or marginalized groups of women are not just
included, but welcomed into feminist organizations;
recognizing that separate organizing can be crucial for the
development of a plurality of women's voices and
perspectives; and working both internationally and locally
to foster the rights and well-being of all women,
particularly the most vulnerable. Will these ongoing efforts
to end the marginalization, exploitation and oppression of
all women be extended to trans women as well?
Another response to the encounter with difference
has been to focus on the ways in which gender itself is
constructed, and to question whether its deconstruction is
a desirable, or even a viable project for feminism. Although
much work has been done on this question from a variety
of perspectives and disciplines, there is no consensus
among feminists on what the best response might be. Some
twenty years ago, Jacqueline Rose (1986) argued that we
should consider the difference between a political identity
for feminism (based on ideas about what women require),
and politicizing feminine identity (based on ideas about
what women are or should be). If feminism is based on
what women require, it involves an ongoing process of
defining our needs in all our differences. If feminism is
based on ideas about what women are or ought to be, then
we become embroiled in interminable disputes over how to
define who counts as a woman, according to what or whose
criteria. While it has always seemed to me that the former
conceptualization provides a stronger, more inclusive basis
for feminism, recent encounters of non-trans feminists with
transwomen have made it more difficult to separate these
two formulations, with the result that it may no longer be
possible to separate the two, either theoretically or
practically.  
It also seems to me that problematizing the
question of identity - what it means to be a woman, a man,
or some other identity - is not necessarily the same thing as
politicizing the feminine, at least not in the narrow sense of
prescribing who gets to be a woman. But it is difficult to
make claims about what women require without having in
mind a specific group of people, as recent claims for
inclusion by transwomen make abundantly clear. One of the
problems suggested by Rose's formulation, then, is the
implication that working to meet women's needs somehow
lets one off the hook of having to define who women are, or
that the question of identity is somehow peripheral or
secondary. Even trans theorist Viviane K. Namaste has
recently advocated putting aside the question of identity to
focus on "how transsexual and transgendered people live in
the social, institutional, and cultural world" (2000, 56).
While Namaste's important work contributes much to our
understanding of the material conditions, history, and lives
of those transgendered people she studies, her view that the
question of identity is not important is untenable. It implies
that the social and political question of how to act in the
world can be adequately addressed without asking how we
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understand our own and others' identities, or that
self-understandings do not inform our theories, our actions,
even our bodies, albeit in complex ways that require
elucidation. I would argue instead that the two strands of
contemporary feminism that Lynne Segal (1999) calls the
"outward looking" (that is, anti-oppression work) and the
"inward looking" (that is, the problematizing of identities),
do not preclude each other, even though we are often asked
to choose between them. Furthermore, when queer,
transgender or feminist work fails to address both of these
strands, something vital is lost. My point is that for a
number of reasons it is not helpful to reject feminist, queer,
or trans theorists' inward-looking focus on the cultural
meaning of transgender identities.
First, transgendered persons pose some very
important questions that non-trans feminists have an
interest in exploring. These questions concern the meaning
of sex/gender identity, the process of embodiment, and the
limits of socialization, discourse, and of gendered subjects
themselves.  One might even argue that we have an3
obligation to explore these meanings and processes in order
to broaden our understanding of trans lives. For example,
in "Rethinking Feminism through Transgender Politics,"
Eleanor Macdonald usefully shows how identity-based
feminist politics and postmodern feminism could benefit
from transgender analyses of the complexity of identity (as
could some versions of trans politics). I suggest that several
other feminists (Califia, Devor, Elliot and Roen, Heyes, and
Hird) have contributed in sympathetic ways to the
development of feminist dialogue on these important
questions.
A second problem with the critique of feminist
explorations of the cultural meanings of trans is that it
threatens to undermine or silence those feminists who, at
the very least, might promote greater public awareness of
trans issues and, at best, might become useful allies. In her
2001 survey of transgender theory, Bernice Hausman
wonders "if it is possible, in this political and academic
climate, to approach transsexualism as a scholarly project
as a feminist" (473-74). The climate she refers to is one in
which all non-trans feminist critique of trans theory is
associated with the explicitly transphobic work of Janice
Raymond, thus tainting all critical endeavours before they
can be considered carefully. Even Namaste's critique of
non-trans feminist work, which is far more complex than
what Hausman describes, suffers from a dismissive
approach to cultural studies research. It also suffers from
what I call methodological prescriptivism - where only one
approach to the study of trans people is considered worthy
- and from a failure to acknowledge any constructive
non-trans feminist engagement with transgender research.
We need to ask, then, whether it is possible for feminists to
take account of transpeople's lives, acknowledging their
different experiences and needs for recognition, without
being construed as transphobic. Without endorsing
Hausman's theoretical approach, I suggest we do need to
take up some of her questions. Are feminists able to discuss
critically the meaning(s) of transgendered lives or are
uncritical endorsements of trans ideas the only acceptable
alternative to outright condemnation of trans lives as
perpetuating patriarchal constructs?  
A third, and possibly more urgent, reason to
question this resistance to feminist explorations of the
cultural meanings of transgendered identity is that it stifles
a valuable source of opposition to a more widespread and
decidedly hostile feminist response. While it is important to
note that some feminists have found productive ways to
engage with trans theory that do not merely "erase" trans
realities, it is also true that much transphobia remains.  This4
is nowhere so evident as in the responses to the recent
Canadian legal dispute surrounding Kimberly Nixon and
the question of who gets to be a woman.  The eruption of5
this particular legal dispute about Nixon's identity in the
context of a rape crisis centre demonstrates the
inseparability of the two strands of feminist focus -
women's rights activism and questions of identity. 
The ongoing legal dispute over whether Nixon, a
male-to-female transsexual, ought to have the right to train
as a counselor at the Vancouver Rape Relief Centre in
Vancouver, British Columbia, raises questions about
feminists' complex relationships to, and assumptions about,
gender, sexuality, and support for diverse sexual struggles.
When Nixon arrived for training as a counselor at this
particular centre, her credentials as a woman were
questioned and she was told that despite having lived as a
woman for fourteen years, only women who were "born"
women and socialized as such could work in that capacity.
Nixon filed a complaint with the British Columbia Human
Rights Commission (in 1995), argued her case before the
Human Rights Tribunal, and won (in January 2002). Since
then, a petition to the provincial Supreme Court of British
Columbia was filed by Rape Relief (June 2002) to quash
the Tribunal's decision ("Petition to B.C. Supreme Court
for Judicial Review") on the grounds that the Tribunal
"erred" in several areas of judgement, including that it
ignored "all of the evidence before it," a claim that is telling
in itself. Nevertheless, the petition met with success in Dec.
2003 (although it too has been appealed). Its success was
due to the decision that transwomen like Nixon do "not
meet Rape Relief's community membership criterion" of
women as "those who have lived their entire lives as
females" (Vancouver Rape Relief Society v. Nixon et al,
para. 103, 118), that Rape Relief does have the right to
make this distinction, and that excluding Nixon was not a
discriminatory act. 
One's response to this decision will of course
depend on one's allegiances to Rape Relief and to what the
Honourable Mr. Justice E.R.A. Edwards called its "article
of faith" (para. 54). This article of faith refers to Rape
Relief's contention that "the experience of living
exclusively as a female" has "political and therapeutic
significance" (para. 125) for its work and that those without
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such experience ought to be excluded. The question of who
gets to be a woman, specifically whether living only part of
one's life as a woman makes one "woman-enough" (para.
118), has been and continues to be the main issue. Before
discussing some of the disturbing ways this question has
been taken up both before and after the various judgments,
I would like to comment briefly on some of the other
implications of the case as I understand it.
While supporters of Rape Relief insist that part of
what was at stake here was preventing men from
demanding access to women's organizations, and
confirming women's rights to organize separately, I find
this fear difficult to credit unless one reads transwomen as
men. So what looks to this group as a victory of women's
rights to organize among themselves, looks to others, such
as myself, as the right of specific organizations to impose
discriminatory standards as long as these can be "justified"
in court as necessary to meeting its goals. Barbara Findlay,
Nixon's lawyer, claims that the goal of ensuring the safety
of women victims of male violence does not logically
require the exclusion of transwomen from the role of
counsellor (2003, 72). Clearly we need to ask whether or
not it does. More difficult for me to understand is why the
Supreme Court Judge took this on faith, although para. 118
of the judgment does state that "Rape Relief was not
required to prove that its primary purpose was the
promotion of the interests of persons who were 'woman
enough' to meet its 'political definition' of women as
persons who had lived their entire lives as females" (BCSC
2003). More disconcerting is the judge's decision that "a
reasonable person excluded for having experienced part of
her life as a male...would recognize that...the basis for her
exclusion...did not compromise the excluded person's
dignity" (BCSC 2003, para. 125). So Nixon is
unreasonable. Presumably this is because a "reasonable
person" in Nixon's shoes would have recognized and
accepted Rape Relief's "article of faith" that "woman
enough" means being a woman all one's life. In any case,
her experience of a "loss of dignity" at being excluded is
judged to be merely subjective, an experience "no
reasonable [that is, rational or objective] person in her
situation would experience" (BCSC 2003, para. 132).
Moreover, the objective impact of exclusion on her dignity
that is required to prove discrimination is said to be
negligible because it is "quite evidently exclusion from a
backwater, not from the mainstream of the economic, social
and cultural life of the province" (BCSC 2003, para. 154).
 No doubt there is much to dispute in this
judgment from a legal point of view: claims about how
other "reasonable" transsexuals might act; the right of
service-providing groups to exclude legally recognized
women; and the role of legal discourse in defining women's
rights. These are tasks best left to lawyers and to legal
scholars. My focus here is on disputes among non-trans
feminists around the definition of a woman and the
implications of those disputes for our relationship with
transwomen in particular. Much of what follows is based on
claims made when the case was still before the Tribunal,
but the wider concerns and the arguments made for and
against remain much the same.
Transsexuals pose a challenge, intentionally or
not, to mainstream feminist conceptions of sex as a stable
and immutable basis of gender, a challenge which raises
questions about the presumed "authenticity" of identity and
about the inclusiveness of feminist politics.  When Judy6
Rebick, former president of the National Action Committee
on the Status of Women, defends Rape Relief's rejection of
Nixon, she claims "The challenge is 'who is a woman?'" It
is a question she believes "we're just beginning to deal
with" (cited in Bailey, 2000). But as Joanne Meyerowitz's
(2002) study of the history of transsexuality in the US
shows, the question of whether "male-to-female"
transsexuals are women has been tossed about in popular
culture at least since Christine Jorgenson's story hit the
press fifty years ago. It has been in the feminist literature at
least since Raymond's famous diatribe against transsexuals
in 1979 and has been discussed with respect to the
Michigan Women's Music Festival since the early 1990s. In
1996, Leslie Feinberg noted that the "one pivotal question"
"being discussed in women's communities all over the
country" is, "how is woman defined?"(109). Perhaps those
who have just noticed there is a question ought to acquaint
themselves with this history before making public and
potentially damaging statements about transwomen.    
The division of feminist opinion over the Nixon
case may be symptomatic of a longstanding and deep divide
among feminists whose theoretical commitments to identity
politics on one hand, and deconstructive politics on the
other, may not be reconcilable. Ann Snitow detailed this
internal division in her 1990 essay, "A Gender Diary," and
it seems she was right to contend it cannot be bridged. At
the risk of widening this divide, I would describe the
location of feminist politics in a presumed universal and
stable identity of "women" as the problematic basis on
which Nixon's claim to womanhood has been rejected by
the women at Rape Relief and by their supporters. In terms
of Rose's distinction mentioned earlier, this is a move that
politicizes identity instead of taking the opportunity to
question it. 
Members of Rape Relief have no trouble deciding
who "real" women are, or knowing what  psychological
capacities they possess. They assert that "we do not agree
that every person that honestly claims to be a woman...is
one," and that because Nixon "didn't grow up female, she
could not empathize with victims of violence seeking
counselling" (cited in Nolan 2000). Lee Lakeman, a
long-time collective member, is more blunt: transwomen
"aren't women. They don't know what it is like to be treated
like a woman. They can't fully appreciate what kind of
oppression and fear women live with" (cited in
Groocock-Renshaw 2001). These ideas were embraced if
not strengthened by two leading national newspaper
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columnists, Michele Landsberg and Margaret Wente, in
their respective newspaper columns, "Rape crisis centre in
B.C. endures assault" (2000) and "Who gets to be a
woman?" (2000). Landsberg, who claims that she would
"pay lip-service" to transsexual women as women,
nonetheless publically declares her outrage that Nixon
would presume to see herself as one. She writes: "Want to
cross-dress and send up our culture's gender strictures by
playing the vamp with a feather boa and sequins? Fine. But
don't show up at the rape crisis centre and ask to counsel
women who have been victimized by male sexual
violence." The view that transsexual women are "really"
men pervades Landsberg's rhetorical claim that the crisis
centre "endures assault" by Nixon whose "unwanted
advances" make her one of the "enemies" of woman-centred
services.
In my view, Wente's potentially useful question,
"who gets to be a woman?" could have inspired some
valuable reflection on the issue. Instead, echoing
Landsberg, Wente implies that the crisis centre is the "real
victim of injustice" and that the prospect of being counseled
by "someone who appears to be a man in drag" would
victimize the women seeking help. The nastiness of these
remarks is echoed by other anti-Nixon feminists whose
articles appear on Rape Relief's website.  Writing for the7
Edmonton Sun, Mindelle Jacobs states Nixon "can stomp
up and down in her over-sized high heels insisting she's a
woman all she wants but some rape victims just might not
buy it." In a National Post article, Christine Boyle shares
her view that Nixon shouldn't counsel rape victims because
they "may feel that someone who lived as a man is not a
peer on the issue of male oppression; and...might have a
prurient interest in confidences respecting sexual/gendered
assaults" (cited in Hume, 2001). If the usefulness of
Wente's question is missed by her, by Landsberg, and by
the supporters of Rape Relief, it is because for them the
answer is clear: One is born a woman, period. Although the
hostile response of Rape Relief is apparently not widely
shared by other crisis centers in Canada,  it does reveal a8
number of questionable assumptions about trans and
non-trans women, based partly on ignorance, partly on fear,
and partly on an intractable feminist identity politic now
called an "article of faith" by the Supreme Court Judge.   
At a recent Women's Studies conference in
Canada, Michelle Lowry summarized these assumptions
and the questions they raise.  The first assumption is that9
one's socialization as a girl or woman defines "women's
experience" as something shared. But this assumption
downplays differences among women, as if the sociological
norms one identifies as part of a patriarchal gender order
are evenly applied to all in one cookie-cutter model, or as
if girls and women have the same relationships to those
norms. It also fails to ask about possible similarities of
experience between trans and non-trans women (both of
whom may have been disparaged for their femininity). The
second assumption is that only non-trans women have what
it takes to counsel women survivors of male violence.
Suzanne Jay, spokeswoman for Rape Relief, asserts that
transwomen "can't possibly know how victimized women
really feel" (cited in Jacobs), and the anonymous women
authors of one Kinesis article claim that there is no
incentive for transwomen to unlearn the supposedly deep
socialization to male privilege (Anonymous, 1998). Given
that transwomen are often targets of male violence
themselves, I suspect they have a better idea of what that
feels like than, say, women who have not been victimized.
Moreover, despite the essentialist claims about socialization
processes, this assumption trades more on stereotypes of
MTFs than on their actual experiences of their childhoods.
The claim that transwomen invade and disrupt women-only
spaces because their supposedly inherent, aggressive
masculinity cannot be "unlearned" is a third (and obviously
related) assumption. Lowry counters this assumption by
pointing out that transwomen do not undergo painful, risky,
expensive and life-altering transitions in order to "invade"
women's spaces, nor do they carry around an inherent
aggressive masculinity. Indeed this idea appears to
contradict Rape Relief's belief as stated on their website
that "violence is learned behaviour and can be unlearned."10
The fourth assumption is that in adopting "feminine norms"
transwomen do not challenge patriarchy and therefore
collude in oppressing non-trans women. Aside from the fact
that this claim contradicts the preceding view that gendered
characteristics are immutable, this claim also assumes that
only certain types of non-trans women are capable of
challenging patriarchy. Moreover, as others have noted, the
claim that transwomen who do not embrace feminism are
oppressors is at best self-serving, and at worst transphobic.
Sadly, these assumptions give transwomen excellent
grounds for being leery of feminism altogether.    
Fortunately, contributions from other approaches
such as ethnomethodology and poststructuralism have
provided alternative perspectives on the question of gender
and transgender. Both offer critical tools for rethinking
questions of sex/gender/embodiment and for developing
alliances with the transgender community. In what follows,
I will focus on the poststructuralist approach developed by
Judith Butler and others because I find it the most
productive.   11
Poststructuralist inquiry into the "subject" of
feminism and the category of "women" has led to a series
of questions about both without rendering us inarticulate,
mute, or apolitical. In my view, its call to subvert dominant
forms of identity involves neither discrediting women as
subjects, nor denying our subordination, nor refusing the
concept of agency, as some feminists fear.12
Poststructuralist feminists do not deny the value of much
feminist theory and practice based on identity categories.
But we do question the way that sex, gender, bodies, and
sexualities have been conceptualized in order to challenge
and critique mainstream constructions of those concepts as
given (either by nature or by culture) and unalterable. From
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a poststructuralist feminist perspective, "a critical
genealogy of the naturalization of sex and of bodies"
(Butler 1990, 147) remains a central political task if we are
to extricate ourselves from the regulatory norms and
practices that restrict our activities and constrain our
identities. This is a political task that some feminists
already share with some trans and queer people.  It is a13
task that can be pursued without idealizing the least
normative identities (the other side of idealization is
erasure, as Viviane Namaste has pointed out in her critique
of Butler). It can also be pursued without disparaging the
more normative identities like straight or queer femininity.
In claiming that the category of women is
"essentially incomplete," "a site of contested meanings"
(15) Butler reiterates arguments made in Julia Kristeva's
1981 essay, "Woman Can Never Be Defined" and in
Jacqueline Rose's 1986 chapter "Femininity and Its
Discontents." These authors usefully challenge the premises
of identity politics that limit, constrain, or prevent
alternative configurations of sex and gender (Butler 1990,
147) or that attempt to demarcate the boundaries of "real"
women. As Judith Halberstam (1998) and Bobby Noble
(2002) argue, pursuing this kind of search for authenticity
by policing categories and boundaries (state sanctioned or
not) relegates alternative or queer embodiments to the
margins. It also reifies and dictates what are arguably
phantasmatic constructions serving patriarchal and
heterosexist interests (even if some radical feminists believe
their interests are also best served by these constructions).
Holding the poststructuralist view does not preclude
feminist arguments in favour of "women-only" space, but
it does not support excluding transwomen whose existence
challenges the taken-for-granted boundaries of that
category.
Given that many trans people identify with
feminism or seek allies in the feminist community,
non-trans feminists need to inform ourselves about their
needs and goals, and to engage both theoretically and
practically with ideas and institutions that oppress them
(Namaste provides an excellent overview of institutional
oppression in Canada). This need not detract from other
important work feminists do. As Geraldine Glattstein
(director of Vancouver's WAVAW Rape Crisis Centre)
acknowledges: "All our work is anti-oppression work, so
why wouldn't we find the oppression of women who feel
they are trapped in the wrong body equally important?"
(cited in Nolan, 2000). As previously noted, the majority of
women's sexual assault centres and transition houses in
British Columbia share Glattstein's belief that excluding
trans women from feminist organizations and denying them
support runs counter to the spirit of feminism today. In my
view, feminists must continue to challenge norms and
expectations around embodiment, around what constitutes
mental and physical well being, around questions of gender
and sexual identity, around access to legal, medical and
social services. Our views will be diverse. They will be
contested, and ought to be contested if we are to deepen our
understanding of each other, and if we are to be allies in the
process of improving the material conditions of all women's
lives. But to reject these efforts prematurely, on the basis
that we already know who deserves our support or who our
"enemies" are, is surely a mistake.
Ignorance of trans concerns in the non-trans
feminist community is no excuse at a time when there exists
an excellent and growing transgender literature, some of
which originated in specifically feminist communities.  For14
example, Pat Califia (1997) and Holly Devor (1997) - both
now transmen - have both published research that provides
a solid political and sociological overview of many of the
issues confronting transpeople from an explicitly feminist
perspective. In arguing for a coalition of gay and trans
activists, Califia provides a thought-provoking analysis of
the history of transphobia and trans activism. Especially
important here is Califia's unequivocal assertion of the
"intrinsic value" of trans people and their contributions to
"our understanding of what it means to be human" (1997,
81). Devor's sociological study of transmen offers a very
different, yet equally valuable study of trans lives. Devor's
inclusion of extensive interview material gives voice to
both personal and political issues of importance to
participants, paving the way for a deeper understanding
which is key to the development of any potential solidarity.
According to Karen Dubinsky (1999), making
alliances between feminist and trans communities obliges
us to ask some difficult questions about sexual identity,
embodiment, psychic and social life, questions that are far
from being settled as the Nixon affair demonstrates.
Cressida Heyes (2003) asks some of the harder political
questions around how feminist commitments to the project
of self-transformation might be brought to bear on disputes
among non-trans feminists, particularly around the question
of bodily transformation.  My questions are: Who or what15
is most threatened by asking the difficult questions about
transsexuality? Is there some "opposite-sex self" (Califia
1997, 117) lurking in each of us that we fear will emerge if
we question the boundaries of gender? If this fear exists,
then does the affirmation of one's sex necessarily create an
antipathy toward transsexuals? Is feminism, like
transsexuality, another "example of gender dysphoria," as
Califia claims (6), hence some kind of natural ally? Why do
some feminists believe they must reject trans women in
order to preserve the possibility of a women-only space?
Can we accept that for some people, sex changes, without
feeling the need to exclude or to vilify them? Will feminists
allow the difficult conceptual and political issues raised by
trans lives to enlarge our understanding of what it means to
be human? I believe it is important to pursue these
questions, not to secure some definitive answer, but in
order to open up a field of inquiry that seems in danger of
being shut down prematurely by persons with very different
stakes in not having them broached in the first place.
 Unfortunately, as the Nixon case demonstrates,
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the least reflective and least informed feminist voices have quickly come to define "the feminist response" to trans
people as decidedly hostile. More work is needed to create
the conditions in which dialogue within feminist
communities and between trans and feminist communities
will enrich our mutual understanding and strengthen our
potential for solidarity.
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ENDNOTES
1. Earlier versions of this paper were given at the Feminist Ethics and Theory Conference in Florida, October, 200l, at the Symposium on
Transgender/Transsexual Theory, Organizing and Cultural Production, York University, Nov. 29, 2002, and at the Centre for Research in
Women's Studies and Gender Relations, University of British Columbia, March 10, 2004.   
2. In 1997 Ricki Anne Wilchins writes: "Who knows what to call transpeople these days?" (15). Given the diversity of those who identify
as transgendered and/or transsexual, and the difficulties of the politics of naming, I shall use "trans" or "transgendered" to refer to anyone
whose gender does not fit the binary gender categories of Western society and who identifies as such. Some people also identify with and
insist on a specifically transsexual identity (Prosser, 1998). Out of respect for these persons, I refer to transsexuals as those who undergo
(or hope to undergo) some sort of physical transition with the help of hormones and/or surgery, and who identify as such. Like Wilchins,
I realize that any name one chooses may offend some readers, despite the explicit intentions of the author to avoid offence. 
3. Cressida Heyes astutely points out that transsexuality, along with other transgender identities, "reconfigures both conventional and
conventionally feminist understandings of sex, gender, and sexuality" often calling into question "the very separability and meaningfulness
of the terms sex, gender, and sexuality"(2003, 1093). In my view, the body figures centrally in our sense of ourselves as women, men, or
other, and in our attractions to others,  but biological makeup alone does not dictate what sense we will make of our bodies, or what identities
we will end up making our own. For a good discussion of the distinction between what is psychically real and what is material in terms of
"sex," see Prosser (1998). 
4. Transphobia refers to expressions of fear and hatred of trans people. It is a term widely used by trans authors and activists at the time of
this writing. 
5. Details of the Kimberley Nixon case were found on the web site of the Rape Relief centre (http://www.rapereliefshelter.bc.ca), between
2001-2004, and last accessed March 9, 2004. For an excellent critique of the case by Nixon's lawyer, see Findlay (2003) or visit her website
at www.barbarafindlay.com. 
6. For a discussion of the concept of authenticity with respect to trans identities, see Hird (2002). 
7. I have no desire to question individuals' claims to be feminists, as some readers have urged me to do. We know we are not a homogeneous
political body, and that we are capable of making mistakes as well as of making profound social and political transformations. 
8. Geraldine Glattstein, the executive director of Vancouver's WAVAW Rape Crisis Centre, says she would welcome a transgendered woman
as a volunteer (cited in Nolan, 2000), and Jacobs notes that in Edmonton, six of the eighty-odd volunteers at the Sexual Assault Centre are
men. Research by Caroline White (2002) demonstrates that 72.5% of sexual assault centres and transition houses in BC were accessible to
transsexual women by 2000. 
 
9. My thanks to Michelle for granting me permission to paraphrase her critique. I have extended it as well. 
10. I believe this kind of thinking borders on the paranoid, as for example when Karla Mantilla writes that "men's interests have found a
clever way to siphon off lesbian and feminist energies into a liberal agenda of identity politics, individual freedom and inclusion which make
us forget altogether about challenging patriarchy" (2000). Mantilla's diatribe against transgender politics includes the idea that FTMs are
joining the oppressors, and establishes an untenable opposition between inclusive politics on the one hand, and combatting male oppression
on the other (2000). This position is echoed in Jeffreys (2003). My thanks to Chris Shelley for bringing Jeffrey's text to my attention. 
11. For fruitful contributions in the ethnomethodological tradition see Fenstermaker and West (2002),  Garfinkel (1967), Kessler and
McKenna (1978; 2000).
12. For an alternative, critical reading of poststructuralism, see Smith (1999).
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13. That some trans persons also sometimes support this belief in an innate core gender identity is understandable, but it remains in my view
highly problematic. 
14. More recent trans texts I have found especially helpful include Green (2001), Prosser (1998), and Rubin (2003). For a discussion of
earlier trans texts see Elliot and Roen, 1998.
15. Heyes (2003) provides an extensive critique of Janice Raymond and Bernice Hausman, which lays crucial groundwork for future
discussions of feminist work on transsexuality.  
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